

Tin Ore Mining, Migration and Conflicts in Plateau State, Nigeria: The Nexus

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Abstract

The discovery of tin ore in the Plateau area, Nigeria, in commercial quantity during the pre-colonial period led to the gradual migration of people from other parts of the country and beyond to the area for a better life. This development led to interactions between the British bourgeoisie and the Nigerian proletariat in the environment. While the interactions between the British capitalist and the labourers during the period was about tin mining, wages and the welfare of the workers in the mines, the interactions among the indigenes and the Hausa/Fulani settlers were suspicious, toxic; thereby leading to violent conflict after the value of tin ore plummeted in the 1980s. This paper examines the contribution of tin ore mining and migration to the incubation and spread of violent conflicts in Plateau State. It argues that the complexity of these conflicts is exacerbated by factors such as competition for scarce resources, ethnicity, religion and struggle for economic dominance. These factors have made conflict resolution blurred and challenging in the environment. It concludes that these conflict drivers have made peaceful co-existence difficult, having stratified the area into segregated environments in educational, religious, residential and social engagement.

Keywords: Tin Ore, Mining, Migration, Conflict, Plateau State, Indigenous Groups and Hausa/Fulani.

Introduction

Until the discovery of tin ore in the Plateau area in 1902 in commercial quantity, the area, like other parts of Northern Nigeria, depended on subsistence agriculture and craft production for livelihood. Prior to this period, merchant capital by the British imperialist, which began during the nineteenth century, had developed considerably on a large scale and was penetrating the area gradually. The introduction of taxation by the British led to the commoditisation of produce by the local farmers, which found its way to the market for sale to pay taxes. Before this period also, tin ore was discovered in small quantities in Ririwan Dalma, mined, transformed and used locally in Bauchi Province (Freund, 1981).

More discovery of tin ore in the Jos Plateau in commercial quantities led to the introduction of the capitalist mode of production in the area, as it alienated labour from subsistence agriculture and the dissolution of social relations. This development marked the establishment of the tin mining industry by the British capitalists in Jos Plateau and began the process of prospecting for tin ore in areas such as Naraguta, Gyel near Bukuru, Ganawuri, Kwall, and Miango. The major tin prospectors led by the Royal Niger Company met stiff opposition from the local communities, who complained about the destruction of their crops and the seizing of their farmlands. Following the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914, the colonial government came up with a law which made the colonial government the owner of lands in Northern Nigeria, not minding the rights of individuals, families and communities. This was ratified in the Mineral Ordinance of 1916 and 1945 which de-emphasized the payment of compensation for lands used for urban development and mineral exploitation (Freund, 1981; Ityavyar & Gundu, 2004).

The Mineral Proclamation Acts of 1910 completely removed and banned all Africans from playing any role in the Nigerian tin production except selling black tin and labour for wages. This development led to the former local African tin miners forming a crucial part of the capitalist labour force in the mining fields but were not large enough to supply the workforce the mining companies needed. This led to the migration of ethnic groups from other parts of the country, such as the Hausa, Kanuri, Nupe, Yoruba, Igbo, Benin, Uhurbo, Tiv, etc., to work in the tin mines. Aside from working in the tin mines, some of the migrants engaged in various forms of trades to service the needs of the mine workers. As the premier tin mining field, Naraguta market was established, and it received traders and men from other parts of the country. From then onwards, migrants constantly appeared on the Plateau from other parts of Northern Nigeria, such as Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Zaria, Borno

and the southern parts of the country. By 1914, there was an estimated community of 'floating population' of immigrants of about 9,570 in the mines, out of which the Hausa community accounted for over 2,250 (Freund, 1981).

Meanwhile, the refusal of the indigenous groups to work in the tin mines initially made the British capitalists embark on 'force labour or labour raid' conscriptions to service the needs of the mines. The massive raid for labour in the far North was due to massive global needs for tin during the Second World War. By 1943, tin mining on the Plateau was at its peak, and there were about 80,000 Africans working in about 180 mining companies on the Plateau. By 1960, Jos Plateau was the sixth largest producer of tin ore in the world and when the value of tin ore plummeted in the 1980s, the Hausa/Fulani and other immigrants turned their attention to dry season farming in the communities and commerce in the city of Jos (Fell, 1939).

Conceptual Framework

Factors that historically moulded the relationship between the indigenes and the immigrants in Jos Plateau ab initio can be viewed from the lens of tin mines, migration, conflict, indigene/settler conundrum which evolved as a result of the establishment of the tin mining industry in 1902 and the development and expansion of commerce in the area.

Tin Ore Mining Industry

The establishment of the tin-ore mining industry in Jos Plateau in 1902 came with a lot of prospects and triggers. Before this period, there were local tin miners and smelters in Bauchi Province whose crude method of mining precipitated the arrival of the British entrepreneurs. They engaged in crude/local underground tin mining activities along the Delima River and later Ririwain Dalma (tin) in Bauchi and Bisichi in the Plateau area. According to Freund,

Tin production passed through three stages that is prospecting, washing and separation at the place of discovery, which transformed 'black tin' into pure tin metal, and smithing, which can be re-smelted tin and fashioned into various objects. At that time, the final production of tin was the transformation of tin straws into objects of pure tin or its alloys. Tin was used in the manufacture of horse-gear. It was made into sheaths, rings and bracelets and mixed with other metals as a finish for bowls, jugs, lamps and plates. It was widely used as solder in conjunction with iron (Freund, 1981).

"Tin ore" refers to the downstream mineral that contains tin, a soft, rare, silver-white metal. It is often found in rocky environments as minerals, combined with other metals such

as tantalum, tungsten, and lithium. The most recognized tin ore in Nigeria is the cassiterite (SnO_2), a tin oxide metal, usually opaque in nature or translucent in tiny crystals. There are other types of tin ore, such as stannite ($\text{Cu}_2\text{FeSnS}_4$), cylindrite (SnS), etc. Of all the types mentioned, cassiterite is the most common tin ore globally. Tin ore is used in soldering to connect pipes or electrical/electronic circuits, bronze, tinplate, glassware production, bearing alloys, and coatings for steel containers and chemicals. According to the International Tin Association (ITA), the world's total amount of tin ore stood at 15.4 million tons at the end of 2019. Tin ore can be used for industrial and commercial purposes (www.britannica.com).

Cassiterite (SnO_2) is the type of tin ore commonly found in Nigeria. It is opaque in nature and can be translucent in thin crystals, with a luster and multiple crystal faces. The two types of cassiterite tin minerals identified in Nigeria are alluvial and eluvial placers, largely derived from erosion, large stocks, and batholiths. As an added advantage, the Nigerian tin field is the only one in the world that is rich in columbite, the principal source of ferrocolumbium, a substance that reduces corrosion (rust) in steel. This usefulness made columbite very important in the development of jet plane engines and put it in high demand during the Second World War and subsequently. Tin ore can be found in commercial quantity in Plateau State, Nigeria, in the Northern Senatorial zone of the state, where Jos, the state capital, is located. At its peak in 1960, Nigeria produced over 10,596 tons of tin and a dividend of over £1,852.814 after the Nigerian Civil War. Other tin ore-producing countries in the world are China, Indonesia, Peru, Bolivia, Thailand, and Malaysia (ngsa.gov.ng, Freund, 1981).

Migration

This is the practical movement of people, either as an individual or as a group, for either a temporary or permanent settlement. The movement may involve population, forced, or labor migration. It can be within a country or across international borders. Migration is always driven by factors such as economic opportunities, escaping natural disasters, escaping conflicts/persecution, or family unification. There are two types of migration such as international migration and internal migration. Economic opportunities were the reasons for migration to the Plateau area during the period (IOM: www.homeaffairs.ec.europa.eu).

The shortfall in labor supply in the tin mines led to the immigration of people from other parts of Nigeria and beyond for work in the mines. Apart from Nigerians, there were African labor migrants from Chad, Niger Republic, and Cameroon to the Jos Plateau. Unlike the unskilled immigrants from the North, skilled workmen from Southern Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone came to work in the tin field, and they were well paid (Freund, 1981).

According to Mangvwat,

It was the tin industry that prompted the British to develop interest in the plateau area in 1902 and establish tin mining fields in Naraguta, Bisichi, Rayfield, etc. Workers/laborers were needed from within and outside the state and even beyond Nigeria to work in the mines. It was voluntary for the indigenes and involuntary for the non-indigenes. Some of the Hausa laborers, when they came to the camp, refused to go back, thereby gradually forming the Hausa settler community in Jos. There were also other immigrants from the Southwest, Southeast, and other parts of North Central who were attracted to the tin business in the Jos Plateau (Mangvwat, 2023).

The table below explains the source of supply of migrant labor. The highest number of wage laborers came from the North and Niger Republic, with a population of about 6,498.

Table 1: Show Origin of Mines Labour in Jos in the 1930s

Groups	Geographical Origin	Population
Hausa	Nigeria and Niger	6,496
Beberi	Borno Province, Nigeria	1,906
Burgirmi	Chad	1,677
Fulani	Nigeria and Niger	1,097
Ibo	Eastern Nigeria	249
Yoruba	Western Nigeria	225
Munshi	Benue	153
Birom	Plateau (Jos)	55
Other Northern Provinces		430
Other Southern Provinces		165
Other Foreigners	West African Citizens	16
Total		12,469

Source: Based on the 1931 Population Census Figure in Freund, B. *Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines*, London, Longman Press, 1980, Cited in Sha, D. P. 2005. *The Politicization of Settler-Native Identities and Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Jos, North Central*, Sterling Harden Publishers Ltd, Ibadan. **Note:** There were other ethnic groups in the North where labour was sourced from that are not included in the table above.

However, by 1945 out of the 189,511 inhabitants of Jos Plateau, 68,902 were immigrants and out of this number, the Hausa were over 12,944 and they all engaged in labour work in

the mines. Meanwhile, labour migration in the Northern Nigeria was concentrated in areas where groundnut agricultural production for export was low. Example were Sokoto and Borno where labour migration was sourced from due to their demography and poor quality of the soil for groundnut production. A survey carried out in 1951 showed that about 27,000 migrants from Sokoto were heading to the minefields for labour work same as the Kanuri from Borno. Zaria and Bauchi Provinces contributed migrants who supplied food and labour in the mines (Freund, 1981).

Table 2: Origin by Province of Forced Labourers, 1942-1944

Province Origin of Workforce	1942 September Planned First Scheduled		1942, Nov-Dec. Workforce		1942-44 Total Actual Workforce	
	No	%	No	%	No	%
Bauchi	3, 500	11.7%	3,184	22.6%	14669	15.8%
Benue	8, 000	26.7%	2,227	15.8%	11987	12.9%
Bornu	3, 000	10.0%	882	6.3%	5, 585	11.4%
Kano	2, 000	6.3%	500	3.5%	1, 952	2.1%
Katsina	2, 000	6.7%	1,700	12.1%	8, 903	9.6%
Niger	1, 500	5.3%	----	3.9%	7, 689	8.3%
Plateau	2, 500	8.3%	-----	----	4, 481	4.8%
Sokoto	3, 500	11.7%	2,272	16.1%	14. 808	16.1%
	30, 000		14, 100		92, 703	

Source: Freund, B. (1980). *Capital and Labour in Nigerian Tin Mines*, London, Longman Press. p. 143.

Conflict

Conflict is inevitable in every society where there are interactions among humans. This is because everyone/groups have different goals, interests, and objectives they are pursuing, and it is the clash of these divergent interests, goals, and aspirations by individuals or groups in an environment that causes conflict. Deng (2011) defines conflict as “an interaction involving two or more parties, actions in pursuit of incompatible objectives or interests resulting in varying degrees of discord.” Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1990) view conflict as “a condition in which one identifying group of human beings (whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, socioeconomic, political, or others) is engaged in conscious opposition to one, more, or other identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible goals.” In the same vein, Coser (1956)

perceives conflict from the traditional standpoint when he defines it as a “struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources in which the aim of the opponents is to neutralize, injure, or eliminate the rivals.”

In this paper, emphasis shall be place on the violent conflict that have ravaged Plateau State since the return to democracy in 1999, leading to persistent crisis in the state. Interpersonal conflict is the most common conflict as it occurs between two or more people/groups in the society, organizations and this can be due to differences over objectives and goals. What normally cause this type of conflict is personality differences, perceptions, clashes of values and interests, power and status differences, lack of information or role incompatibility and scarcity of resources.

Although conflict is generally perceived to be negative or dangerous, there are some positive aspects of it and these are;

- i. It stimulates individuals to exert more efforts and to work hard by using his ability, skills and talents.
- ii. It leads to a more productive and creative ideas in an organization.
- iii. It stimulates individuals to exert more efforts to work hard in a conflict situation, the individual uses his ability, skills and talents
- iv. Conflicts contribute to social changes which ensure intergroup and interpersonal dynamics and this remain fresh and reflective of recent realities and this add varieties to individual's organizational lives.
- v. It facilitates mutual understanding of the problems among individuals in conflicts and enhance better coordination among management and the people.

Conflict can be sourced from beliefs, access to resources, economics, prestige, historical claims, etc. Identity is the major source of conflict, and identity is sourced from culture, and culture can be sourced from ethnicity and religion. Identity plays an important role in the inception and escalation of violent conflict. Identity conflict flourishes more in groups since it serves the psychological needs more comprehensively and more potently. The peculiar ability of the group identity to serve the human identity impulse may partially explain why intergroup conflict frequently occurs along ethnic, political, and religious fault lines. Therefore, identity is the progressive construction of meaning on the basis of cultural attributes, which is given priority over other sources of meaning (Tanko, 2017).

Other forms of identity include racial, national, social, class, and gender. It is also possible to have a sub-identity within an identity type. For example, within the Christian faith, there are the Orthodox, Protestant, and Pentecostal; and also in Islam, there are the Sunni, Shia, Alawite, etc. Meanwhile, functions of identity are providing the structure or awareness in understanding who a person/group is and providing the meaning and direction through commitments, values, and goals. It also provides a sense of personal control and free will to enhance consistency and commitments and provides the ability to recognize potentials in future possibilities and alternative choices. It gives direction through commitments, values, and goals. Meanwhile, conflict perception is the belief that individuals/groups have about themselves and others. This can mitigate or aggravate conflicts and make resolution easier or difficult. Perception is a product of competition. Perceptions by the indigenous groups and the Hausa/Fulani settlers escalated and protracted the conflicts in the state (Tanko, 2017; Best, 2007).

Methodology

The paper adopts the descriptive and analytical method of data analysis in explaining how the establishment of the tin ore industry in the Jos Plateau and the migration of people to the place remotely incubated the conflicts that are threatening the peace of Plateau State presently. The paper sourced opinions from respondents on how the early arrival of Hausa/Fulani during the pre-colonial period helped incubate conflicts in the state. The interview is complemented with relevant textbooks, journal articles, relevant reports, and internet sources.

Theoretical Framework

To establish the nexus between tin ore mining, migration, and conflicts on the plateau, the paper explores the social conflict theory as postulated by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. According to them, the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle, and there is a structural link between the economic system and the political system, and this link affects other social structures in the society (Sterba, 1982). The class struggle refers to the bourgeoisie/capitalists and the proletariats who migrated to the Plateau area during the colonial period following the establishment of the tin ore mining industry. It looked at the role of the colonial state and its policies in incubating conflict through exploitative policies of forced labor and taxation to achieve its aims and objectives. Meanwhile, when class relations are at a pathological level and the exploitation associated with it is sharp, the masses become highly agitated, resulting in violent conflict. The theory challenged the status

quo as the cause of macro-conflict in the state, which has received global attention presently (Raimi, 2017).

The Nexus

The establishment of the colonial tin industry and its gradual evolution to its peak in the 1960s came with attendant consequences for the locals. As a source of foreign exchange for Nigeria then, there were policies put in place by the colonial government that made the tin mining business successful. Some of these policies were

- i. The taking over of the local tin mining business from the locals, thereby making them to be part of the labor force in the mines.
- ii. After the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914, the colonial government came up with a law that made the government the owner of lands in Northern Nigeria, not minding the rights of individuals, families, and communities.
- iii. The Mineral Ordinance of 1916 and 1945, which emphasized the payment of compensation for land used for urban development and mineral exploration.
- iv. The mineral proclamation of 1910, which banned all local miners from playing any role in the Nigerian tin production except selling labor for wages.
- v. The introduction of taxation into the system compelled the locals to work in the mines, which guaranteed monetized wages in order to pay taxes to the state (Freund, 1981; Ityavyar and Gundu, 2004).

The conflict was provoked by factors such as opposing value systems, stiff political competitions, aggressive competition for economic resources, etc. There is a symbiotic relationship between ethnicity, religion, and class within a society, and each of these runs into another. The conflicts were caused by ethno-religious factors due to its diverse ethnic, religious, cultural, and racial groups. These groups included the indigenous ethnic groups, the Hausa/Fulani who migrated to Plateau since the pre-colonial period, the Yoruba, Igbo, Tiv, and a plethora of other ethnic groups who emigrated to the area during the tin mining business.

Traditionally, the Hausa claimed to have produced the Sarkin (chief) Jos from 1902 to 1948, when the last Sarkin Jos, Isiaku, died, a claim the indigenous groups have refuted, insisting that those Hausa chiefs only controlled the mining camps and markets around the

mining communities. They were appointed by the mines' administrators to control their co-laborers in the tin mines and not the indigenes; thus, the title of Sarkin Hausawa (Chief of Hausa) was given. Also, as part of Lord Lugard's idea of native administration as spelled out in his Political Memoranda of 1913-1914, the establishment of native authority helped in the expediency of the indirect rule system in Northern Nigeria. Under the Native Administration Acts, no independent revolting pagans were to be included in the jurisdiction of the Muslim ruler without the permission of the governor general, and the native chiefs were to be recognized as independent rulers. PIDAN (2010, 77, 81, 83) emphasized that even the Hausa leader at that time, Alhaji Garba Barka-Zuwa Jere, in his letter to the District Officer of Jos in 1955, acknowledged Gbong Gwom Jos, an indigene, as the 'owner of the land,' Sarkin Jos, and therefore pleaded for the permission for the Hausa to have a chief of Hausawa in places such as Bukuru, Dorowa, Gurum, etc., where the Hausa have large populations in Plateau State.

Table 3: List of the Acclaimed *Hausa Sarkin Jos* from 1902 to 1948

S/NO	NAME	YEAR OF REIGN
1	Sarkin Jos, Salihu	1902-1904
2	Sarkin Jos, Ahmadu Dan'na	1904-1907
9	Sarkin Jos, Saidu	1927-1935
10	Sarkin Jos, Garba Waziri	1925-1927
11	Sarkin Jos, Isiaka	1935-1948

Source: Bagudu, N. (2004). *Recrudescence Civil Disturbances and Human Rights: The Jos and State-Wide Crises*, Jos, League of Human Rights. p. 46

The concept of Jos Native Authority (Sabongari) was designed by the colonial administration to accommodate the teeming population of immigrants working in the mines in the Jos Plateau. What this implied was that the administration of mining camps did not involve the indigenes, nor did it influence them, as the colonialists did everything to make mining activities smooth within the environment. The contention by the indigenous ethnic groups in Jos is that the names in table 3 above were Sarkin Hausawa in the tin mining camps scattered around Jos and its environs and not on the entire Jos Plateau. The groups went further to remind the Hausa/Fulani that the Justice Niki Tobi-led Commission of Inquiry report for the 2001 Jos crisis scolded them on the consequences of distorting the

truth to suit their purpose or score cheap goals. Tobi said in a philosophical and didactic manner in pages 51, 52, 55, 56, and 67, paragraphs 3.46, 3.53, 3.54, and 3.56 that;

It is the feeling of the commission that as long as the elders do not tell the youths the truth about the ownership, half-truths as contained in exhibit 339 will continue to threaten peace in this great city and cause violent crises. The elders owe posterity the duty to tell the youth the truth that the Hausa were not the founder of Jos and therefore not the owner of the city. They should also tell the youth where their ancestral home or root is.

Speaking further, Tobi averred

The foundation and subsequent ownership of a town is a matter of traditional history, and history, according to *Cicero*, is "the witness of the time, the torch of truth, the memory, the teacher of life, and the memory of antiquity. " History is not the kind of discipline... whims and caprices to suit his situation. The event of history must blend smoothly with the past. Mere rhetoric, which has no relationship with the past... It will be tantamount to selling or disgracing history if tin mine workers are said to be the owners of the town Jos... History hardly lies in its chronological record of events, and if history lies, it is as a result of human manipulations. ... (Cited in PIDAN, 2010)

Even though *Islam* was the standard for political identity, authority and legitimacy, participation, representation, and recruitment into the colonial government in Northern Nigeria, Plateau, and other Middle Belt people continued to assert and maintain their identities as Christians in the region. The creation of the Plateau Province out of the Bauchi Emirate in 1926 and the increased tin mining activities in the area, which robbed them of their lands, led to discontent and agitation by the indigenous groups in Jos such as Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta. The Berom in particular fought for increased land compensation and the rehabilitation of lands used by the mining companies. (Bagudu, 2004).

Conflict Incubation, Identity Formation, and Inter-Ethnic Relations in the Jos Plateau

Tin mining businesses in the Jos Plateau deprived the indigenous farmers of their lands. The scarcity of land for agriculture as a result of tin mining activities was a source of conflict for the Berom and other indigenous groups in the area. This discontent made the Berom the largest indigenous ethnic group to form the Berom Progressive Union (BPU) in 1947 to fight for their rights for increased land compensation and the rehabilitation of lands used by the

mining companies while still working in the mines to enable them to pay taxes. The BPU and other indigenous groups also agitated for the creation of Native Authority (NA) to push for political, economic, and social rights (Freund, 1981).

After the emergence of Rwang Pam as the Sarkin Jos in 1948, the Berom continued to push for more autonomy and recognition from the colonialists, and it paid off with the renaming of the Native Authority as the Berom Native Authority. This made the Hausa protest, and the name was immediately changed to Jos Native Authority in 1955 but was dominated by the indigenous groups led by the Berom. The mining companies did not want the indigenes to extend their dominance to the mining camps and therefore created a system of dual administration where the indigenes were placed under political officers, while the mining camps and settlement were placed under the direct management of a Hausa man, Bunu, from Bauchi, and the post was like that of a district head in the mining camps and markets in the form of villages. The colonialist extended more favor to the Hausa/Fulani with the establishment of the Alkali Native Court, to the dissatisfaction of the indigenous groups. On the part of the Hausa/Fulani, the refusal of the indigenous groups in Jos to accept them as indigenes, as was done in places such as Wase and Kanam in Plateau and Lafia, Keffi, and Nasarawa in the former Benue Province, is the cause of the tension in Jos (Bagudu, 2004).

Despite the anxiety, agitations, and complaints by the indigenous ethnic groups and the Hausa/Fulani during the colonial period, there was no confrontation, as it remained at the conflict level. It was the post-colonial governments, especially the military, who directly and indirectly interfered in the political processes in Jos Plateau, and this raised the critical question about the ability of post-colonial states to manage conflicts among groups. Notable was the creation of the Jos North Local Government Area in 1991 and the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato as the caretaker management chairman in April 1994, after the first was created in 1991. Also, the appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammad as the Coordinator of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) for the Local Government Area, all of them settlers or non-indigenes (Sha, 2005; Best, 2007).

The nomination of Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande, a settler by late President Musa Yar'Adua in 2009 as a minister of the Federal Republic, a slot meant for a Plateau indigene, was a violation of section 147(3) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The relative dominance of the Hausa/Fulani in government at the center may have accounted for this. By this action, the central government in Nigeria seems to be protecting and promoting the interest of the Hausa/Fulani settlers in Plateau State (Nwagwu, 2016).

Sources of Conflicts in Plateau State

Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, the state has been embroiled in violent conflicts between the indigenous ethnic groups and Hausa/Fulani settlers over a lot of contending issues. Although the violence is always assumed to be an ethno-religious posture or outlook, the conflicts have a lot of drivers, and among them are

The Formation of Developmental Associations

Ethnic associations were formed by groups to fight for the rights of their people as it concerns education, jobs, scholarships, economic opportunities, and social well-being. The first ethnic associations in Plateau State were the Berom Progressive Union (BPU) in 1947, later renamed the Berom Educational and Cultural Organisation (BECO); the Anaguta Development Association (ADA); and the Afizere Cultural and Development Association (ACDA). The Hausa/Fulani settlers in 1987 formed the *Jasawa Development Association*. Unlike other major ethnic groups in the state, *Jasawa* was formed to fight for the recognition of the Hausa/Fulani as indigenes of the Jos Plateau, using all forms of antics and intimidation in the process. The Hausa/Fulani argument of having founded Jos as a virgin land and developed it to modern city status may have informed their decision (Best, 2007; PIDAN, 2010).

The Creation of Jos North Local Government Area

Arguably, the creation of the Jos North Local Government Area in 1991 by the Ibrahim Babangida-led administration helped incubate the crisis that has ravaged the Jos Plateau presently. This resulted in the indiscriminate movement of the majority of the indigenous population in the Jos metropolis to the newly created Jos South Local Government Area, thereby leaving the Hausa/Fulani as the most populous ethnic group in the newly created Jos North Local Government Area. There was so much joy and optimism among the Hausa/Fulani that the aim of forming the *Jasawa* group (the people of Jos) has been achieved while looking forward to controlling the political and economic fortunes of the city. On the contrary, the indigenous groups fumed with anger, embarrassment, and fear that their rights as indigenes had been transferred to the settlers. The fears and tensions were further heightened following the appointment of a Hausa/Fulani as the first caretaker chairman of the local government area, Alhaji Sanusi Mato, in 1994, which led to the first violent clashes in 1994.

Indigene Certificate of Plateau State

The introduction of the indigene certificate into the 1979 Nigerian Constitution allowed the local government areas in the country the discretion in deciding who qualifies for it in their local council. Consequently, most local government areas collaborated with the traditional authorities in their domain to identify who qualifies for the certificate. This arrangement made the indigene certificate the passport for recognition in states and local government areas in Nigeria.

In Jos North and other local government areas in Plateau State, the Hausa/Fulani complained that without the indigene certificate in places where their population is huge, they are "stateless," their children helpless, and they are losing the opportunity to access this important document that helps them obtain political and economic opportunities. They also complained that before the Jos North Local Government Area was created in 1991, the indigene certificates were shared equally among the indigenes and the settlers, and they were signed by the district heads. At the creation of Jos North Local Government Area in 1991, the trend continued as the certificate was signed and issued to everyone. This development made the indigenous groups complain that allowing the Hausa/Fulani to continue to access the native certificates deprived them of the job opportunities, scholarships, and appointments that were meant for them in Jos and in the state (Bach, 1989).

During the chairmanship of Frank Bagudu Tardy, an indigenous 'residency certificate' was introduced. It was meant to show that an individual who was not an indigene had been or was still a resident of Plateau State and was eligible to contest for political positions within the state but not eligible for political appointments or using a state or local government agency to gain employment. The chairman, Frank Tardy, used the district heads to get applications for native forms approved. The memo excluded the districts and wards occupied by settlers in Jos North. Among the settler groups, it was only the Hausa/Fulani who protested their exclusion and asked that the status quo be maintained. While the protest lasted, public interest increased in Jos and in other local government areas in the state, which also introduced the indigenous certificate and the settler certificate for indigenes and settlers, respectively. The population became polarized in and around those places, leading to the incubation of conflict as the two groups manipulated the situation in Jos and its environment in a way that was likened to a zero-sum game (Best, 2007).

Indigene/Settler Dichotomy

The indigene/settler dichotomy is the contention over the ownership of Jos between the indigenous ethnic groups and the Hausa/Fulani settlers. Apart from ethnicity and religion, the indigene/settler syndrome is one of the formidable factors for mobilizing sentiments and

sensibilities of the people in the Jos Plateau. For example, the inter-communal conflicts between indigenous Christians and Muslim settlers in Yelwa/Shendam between 2002 and 2004 resulted in the death of about 2000-3000 people. In 2004, an armed Muslim militia attacked and killed over 75 Christians, and over half of them were killed inside church while worshipping. In a reprisal attack on the 2nd of May, 2004, well-armed Christian youths surrounded and killed over 700 Muslims in Yelwa town, destroyed properties, and displaced many in the Shendam Local Government Area. A week later, Muslim militia in Kano revenged the killings in Plateau State by killing over 200 Christians in Kano State. It can be seen that a localized dispute in Plateau State escalated into religious conflict of national dimensions, and one notable feature of these conflicts was the religious and ethnic coloration they carried. The fatalities in the conflicts were so severe that on 18th May, 2004, President Olusegun Obasanjo declared a state of emergency in Plateau State (PIDAN, 2010; HRW, 2005).

The Manipulations of Religion

The majority of Plateau's episodic spectacles of violent clashes are always along religious and ethnic lines. The reason for the persistent conflicts, according to research, is the failure of the government to wield the big stick on violence perpetrators in the state despite reports of commissions of inquiries. Religion has been used as a veritable tool in ventilating any secret motives by perpetrators of violence, and this situation has become endemic to the extent that a mere quarrel between a Christian and a Muslim is often accorded religious interpretation, thereby resulting in violent clashes. Even elections in the state involving the indigenes and the Hausa/Fulani are viewed from the lens of religion and ethnicity (Sayne, 2012).

In parts of Jos and Yelwa, religious intolerance led to the partitioning of areas along religious lines in the area of education, accommodation, and social activities. In Jos metropolis, areas dominated by the Muslims are tagged "Istanbul" because they were taken over by Muslims from Christians during the crisis, and the same is applicable to the areas that were controlled by the Muslims that Christians took over; they are tagged "Jerusalem." These inscriptions remind passers-by of what happened to the original Istanbul in Turkey and Jerusalem in the Middle East, which were taken over by Muslims and Christians, respectively. Parties in the conflict used racist, separatist, clash of culture, and rhetoric to justify their actions. Even though some elites try to downplay the role of religion in conflict escalation, the truth remains that it is a sore point, to the extent that some of the security personnel that were sent to quell these crises took sides due to religious and ethnic affiliations (Nguvugher, 2014).

Media Propaganda

The media play an active role in abetting or prolonging conflict in an environment, and this can be seen in the kind of information it relays or the propaganda churned out to the public. This is what plays out during the conflicts in Plateau State as some elites, because of their influence in the society and access to the media, whether print or electronic, portray the opposing parties as the aggressors in the conflict through the information they relay to the public. Between 2001 and 2010, parties in the conflicts in Plateau State carried out vicious propaganda by exploiting some local media houses in Nigeria, both print and electronic, and foreign radio stations such as the Hausa services of the BBC, VOA, and Radio France International in disseminating information about the crisis. The reason for this media propaganda, especially on the part of the Hausa/Fulani, is to source pity and favor from the Arab community for aid and mercenaries for reprisal attacks. It is on record that the 2004 Yelwa/Shendam crisis, Dogo-Nahwa of 7th March, 2010; the Christmas bombing of December, 2010; and the massacre that took place in Barkin Ladi and Riyom Local Government Areas in 2012 were all reprisal attacks carried out allegedly by mercenaries from Niger and Chad Republics who were sympathetic to the plight of the Hausa/Fulani in the state (PIDAN, 2010; Newswatch, 2010).

The style of reportage by the media houses during crises negates the code of constructive and investigative journalism, which allows for censorship of information before it is published. The Daily Trust Newspaper in particular was fingered as being in the vanguard of media propaganda during the period with its biased reportage to paint the Christians as the harbinger of the violence in the state and the Hausa/Fulani as those that were killed because they were non-indigenous. By allowing ethnicity and religion to encroach into the practice of journalism, the paper has denigrated the ethos of journalism as the Fourth Estate of the Realm. For the avoidance of doubt, the violent conflicts in Plateau State affect both the indigenes and the non-indigenes in the loss of lives, property, and displacement, as no particular group is singled out for pogrom as reported by some media houses (PIDAN, 2010).

Recommendations

Firstly, there is the need to deepen democracy in Nigeria to accommodate all citizens, as this will promote good governance not only in Plateau State but everywhere in the country. With this, the struggle for scarce resources by the indigenes and settlers, as is the case in Plateau State, will be greatly reduced. The indigenous/settler consciousness in the state is engineered by the elite who feel schemed out at the state and federal level in benefiting from the commonwealth and, therefore, see their local environment as the only alternative for

survival. The indigenous/settler syndrome can be deconstructed with the aim of attaining inter-ethnic harmony in the state.

Secondly, it has been discovered that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has contributed greatly to violent conflicts in the state. It is suggested that the security agencies should carry out a comprehensive and effective program of disarming the citizens who are in possession of illegal firearms. It has been discovered that most of these arms are brought into the state through our porous borders by gun-runners and mercenaries. Firearms have been greatly used in the farmers/herders conflict in the state, and this has also led to banditry, where families and communities have been displaced. There should be proper delineation of grazing routes to minimize farmers and herders' conflict in the communities.

Since the Hausa lost out on the traditional stool in 1948, they have been agitating for the restoration of the Wakilin Garin Jos as opposed to what is granted to settlers in Jos, e.g., Walikin Hausawa, Walikin Yoruba, and Walikin Igbo. They should be contented with the Hausawa of Jos, which they presently enjoy. They should accept the fact that traditional institutional matters are the exclusive preserves of the indigenes anywhere. However, constitutional rights and privileges of settlers in the state should be protected, and laws that discriminate against the settlers should be abrogated.

For a lasting peace to thrive in Plateau State, there is a need to revisit reports of the Commission of Inquiries into all the violent conflicts in the state beginning with the first in 1994, implement all of them, and punish all those indicted in those reports in order to act as a deterrent to others. It is because no perpetrators of violence have been brought to book that others have been emboldened to continue in their nefarious activities in the state. Also, governments, both state and federal, should compensate individuals and families who suffered negatively in those clashes. The role of the security personnel during those conflicts should be thoroughly investigated, and those of them who took sides rather than carrying out their lawful duty of maintaining peace and security should be severely punished.

Conclusion

The establishment of the tin ore industry in Jos Plateau State in 1902 led to the migration of people from other parts of the country and beyond for greener pastures. During the period, concentration and focus by the migrants were on working for wages in the tin mines. The strict administration of the mining camps by the colonialists ensured peaceful coexistence among the residents of the state, both indigenous and immigrants. Even though conflict set in the 1940s between the indigenes and the Hausa/Fulani settlers as a result of the controversy over the emergence of Rwang Pam as the first indigenous Sarkin Jos, the

conflict existed only in the mind. The decolonization period and the emerging independent nations, of which Nigeria was one of them, changed the trajectory of the hitherto existing norms in the country's social existence, as it transformed conflicts from the mind to violent clashes. The 1990s marked the turning point in conflict incubation and violence clashes following the creation of the Jos South Local Government Area out of the former Jos Local Government Area and the appointment of Hausa/Fulani as the chairmen instead of the indigenes in the Jos North Local Government Area.

After the first crisis in 1994, there were other violent conflicts in 1998, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2010, and 2012 in the state, and these had reverberating effects in the local government areas and communities where indigenous farmers and Fulani herders attacked, killed, and displaced themselves. While the Nigerian Constitution allows Nigerians to reside freely anywhere in Nigeria, there is a need for the indigenes and settlers to exhibit a high level of decorum, cultural respect, and understanding in their domain in order to enhance peace and security in Plateau State.

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