



## Indigene/Settler Conflicts in Plateau North: It's Implication, 2001-2015

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### Abstract

*Conflict parties played a major role in prolonging the conflicts in Plateau North. While the indigenous ethnic groups relied on the indigeneship rights as enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution, having been the first to inhabit the area, the Hausa hinged their argument on the citizenship rights of all Nigerians to reside anywhere within Nigeria and enjoy the rights and privileges that accrue to them as Nigerians. The Fulani pastoralists, on their part, relied on the grazing routes/rights arrangement by the colonialists to stake their claims in the communities of Plateau North. This paper examines the implication of perceptions in the indigene/settler conflict in the Northern Senatorial Zone of Plateau State, Nigeria. It argues that different perspectives by conflict parties, which made the conflict intractable, led to the distortions of the hitherto residential, educational, religious, and social arrangements in the zone, thereby turning Jos and its environs into a contested area. The paper blames this development on the indigene/settler syndrome, which heightened the tempo of conflict in the zone rather than assuaging it. It concludes that there was a need for the harmonization of the indigeneity and citizenship laws through legislative*

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*and judicial processes to ensure peaceful co-existence of Nigerians wherever they reside in the country.*

**Keywords:** conflict, indigene/settler, Indigenous groups, Hausa/Fulani, and Plateau North

### Introduction

Over the last two decades, Plateau North, especially the capital, Jos, experienced protracted violent conflict. The perennial conflict pitched the indigenous ethnic groups such as Berom, Afizere, Anaguta, Irigwe, Miango, Rukuba, etc. against the Hausa/Fulani settlers. The clashes resulted in the destruction of lives, properties, and livelihoods and the displacement of residents. While some of the conflicts stemmed from the struggle for indigeneity rights and chieftaincy stools in Jos, the struggle for land for farming and cattle grazing, water, and other key natural resources in the communities meant that land-based conflict easily became integrated with grievances that related to ethnicity, religion, and politics.

Struggles over values and resources between or among social and political groups dominated human history, and it was this struggle that constantly featured in human interaction in various dimensions that led to conflict. Nigeria is a pluralistic state, highly complex with diverse multi-ethnic, multilingual, multicultural, and multireligious groups. This identity made the country be divided along the lines of religion, culture, ethnicity, and regional blocs, thereby causing violent conflict. Though the mere existence of diverse ethnic or religious groups did not cause conflict, marginalization and discrimination of these groups did.<sup>1</sup>

Migration to new settlements and the attendant conflict contributed to the making and shaping of the histories of people and records revealed a large scale of in and out settlement through migration as well as attendant conflicts. The historic contacts with people from different parts of the country, especially the indigenous groups, were all product of migration. Similarly, various indigene/settler, inter-ethnic conflict or crisis, wars of expansion, religious and trade conflicts were all indices of the prevalence of conflicts in parts of Plateau State.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> R.A. Dunmoye. "General Survey of Conflict in the Middle Belt Zone: Benue, Nasarawa, Kaduna, Kogi, Kwara, Plateau and FCT", *African Peace Review—Journal of Centre for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution*, Special Edition. (2003). p.26; Okpeh Ochayi Okpeh. "Inter-Group Migrations, Conflicts and Displacement in Central Nigeria", in T.Falola and O.Okpeh eds, *Population Movements, Conflicts and Displacement in Nigeria*, Trenton-(New York, African World Press, 2008). pp. 19-21

<sup>2</sup> Eghosa E. Osaghae and Rotimi Suberu. "A History of Identities, Violence and Stability in Nigeria", *Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRIHSE)*, Working Paper. Vol. 6(January 2006. p.4. Available at [www.researchgate.net](http://www.researchgate.net). Accessed 31/05/2021; John N. Paden. "Faith and Politics in Nigeria: Nigeria as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World", Washington DC, *US Institute of Peace (USIP)*. (2008) Available at [www.amazon.com](http://www.amazon.com). Accessed 31/05/2021

In Plateau North, it assumed an ethno-religious outlook as its effects were so disastrous on the socio-economic development as well as on the peaceful coexistence of the inhabitants of the area. It made Jos metropolis, assumed the status of a contested city, where the indigenous groups and the Hausa/Fulani settlers competed over the ownership and control of the city. Conflict in a contested city was centred around class, race, ethnicity, and religion and there were some in which the state played a role in mitigating or exacerbating the conflict. Religion became an identity marker in manipulating and perpetuating the conflicts, as residential and social arrangements were patterned along ethno-religious fault lines.<sup>3</sup>

In human histories, issues bordering on communal and inter-ethnic conflicts are common phenomena, as conflict was a reality of social relations at the individual, group, organization, community, and societal levels. Meanwhile, the lingering conflict that emerged from the indigene/settler phenomenon in various parts of Plateau North stemmed from the conception, definition, and perception of the character of who was an indigene and who was a settler and was seen from the points of view of what rights accrue to these people. These views arose from the unhealthy, divergent ethnic-based interests, desires, and aspirations of the crude competitions for scarce resources to meet the conflicting demands of human relations in the zone. The trends resulted in the colossal loss of lives and properties, destruction of communities, and displacement of millions of residents.<sup>4</sup>

### **Conceptual Clarification**

Factors that historically constructed the perspectives of conflicts in Plateau North among the indigenous people and the Hausa/Fulani settlers were viewed from the lens of indigeneship and citizenship, indigeneship certificate, indigene/settler dichotomy, religion, ethnicity, among others, and they are interrelated and interwoven.

### **Indigeneship and Citizenship**

The concept of indigeneship and citizenship became a matter of concern in Plateau North and the entire state at the return of democracy in 1999. This was because residents struggled to manage diversities among different ethnic groups in the zone, particularly the indigene/settler dichotomy among the same people who lay equal claims to indigeneship and citizenship. These were people who lived together since pre-colonial times and engaged in cultural, religious, economic, and political exchange. The above points, however, generated a lot of pertinent questions concerning indigenization and citizenship rights in Nigeria, and these were;

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<sup>3</sup> A. C. Hepburn. *Contested Cities in the Modern World*, (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

<sup>4</sup> Idanosa Osaretin. "Ethno-Religious Conflict and Peace Building in Nigeria: The Case of Jos, Plateau State", *Academic Journal of Inter-Disciplinary Studies*. Vol 2 (1), (2013). pp.349-360.

- i. Who was a Nigerian?
- ii. What were the qualifications for Nigerian citizenship?
- iii. Does one qualify as an indigene of a community in Nigeria irrespective of his location, ethnicity, and religious affiliations?
- iv. Should factors such as indigeneship, migration, or any other extraneous factors determine, deny, or limit what a citizen enjoys or the level he/she could aspire to?

The Nigerian Constitution recognized every Nigerian as a citizen on an equal basis, and the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions support Nigerians to reside freely in any part of the country without hindrances. According to Chapter 3, Sections 25, 26, and 27 of the 1999 Constitution, citizenship in Nigeria is gotten through birth, registration, and naturalization. Citizenship, as spelt out in the law, was constituted with the objective of promoting national unity among Nigerians from different cultures, building a free society for all Nigerians, and also, as much as possible, promoting reciprocal obligations between the Nigerian state and the citizens. It was to build a strong, vibrant Nigerian economy through a National Development Plan (NDP) that revolved around a free, democratic, and egalitarian society in which everyone, despite gender and ethnic and religious differences, was not discriminated against.<sup>5</sup>

Despite the above assertion, the implementation and application of citizenship in Nigeria were very problematic, and this made Nigerians build sub-national identities through support and identification. Nnamdi corroborated this assertion thus:

The problem of indigeneship and citizenship is that while the Constitution says that Nigerians have the right to settle and own properties anywhere in the country if they desire, in practice the indigenes think they have rights over the settlers. The law grants equality to all citizens. The problem is that Nigerian law has colonial content in it. Before the creation of states in Nigeria, anybody could move to any part of Nigeria, settle there, and work, but with the creation of states, discrimination started. This is why it has been difficult to build a strong, united Nigeria.<sup>6</sup>

In the same vein, Ishaq averred that:

The Nigerian Constitution allows every Nigerian to reside anywhere in the country. The Hausa have been here since pre-colonial times and contributed a lot to the development of Plateau State. I believe we have rights here, whether political, economic, or social. Give us our rights,

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<sup>5</sup> Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (As Amended), 1999. pp. 31-32

<sup>6</sup> Nnamdi Aduba, 68 years, Oral Interview, University of Jos, Jos North LGA, Plateau State. Nigeria. 22/06/2023.

... but they are saying the Hausa/Fulani are trying to bring back the Uthman Dan Fodio Jihad and install an emir in Jos. This is why the conflict persists: because we dominated politics during the pre-colonial and colonial periods and produced the Sarkin of Jos till 1948, and we named all the streets, roads, and parts in Jos....<sup>7</sup>

Following from above, the 1999 Constitution recognized that there were indigenes and citizens in Nigeria. The same constitution complicated the issue by narrowing the definition of citizenship and indigeneity by specifying three ways one can become a citizen of Nigeria. Whereas citizenship by birth came through genealogy, citizenship by registration and naturalization were obtained through marriages in the country, respectively, though this was strictly for foreign nationals. How could one then become an indigenous person of a community?

The provision of the Nigerian Constitution and its operation engendered discrimination among those who claimed indigene and citizen, and this was not in line with the universally acceptable law as regards citizenship and its practice. Dauda explained that:

Jos North, which is dominated by the Hausa/Fulani, is the heartbeat of Plateau State. The indigenes see the far north as their enemy. Like me, whose grandparents migrated and settled here, I'm not recognized, and I can't ask for anything. When my father came from Kano in 1939, it took them 70 days to trek to this place. It has been difficult for us here, yet we pay taxes. The Muslims and Christians are the same. When I was studying in Germany, it took me four months to meet a Black man, and when we met, we were so happy... On the part of the Muslims, there is a problem when you decide to import the Saudi Arabian dynastic ideology into a secular state like Nigeria. We killed a fellow Muslim, thinking that he/she was a Christian or vice versa.<sup>8</sup>

According to Section 25 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution, the following persons are citizens of Nigeria by birth;

- i. Every person born in Nigeria before the date of independence, either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents belongs or belonged to a community indigenous to Nigeria.

<sup>7</sup>Mohammad Lawal Ishaq, 57 Years, Oral Interview, 85 Yaudoka Street, Jos, Jos North LGA, Plateau State, Nigeria. 06/07/2023.

<sup>8</sup> Dauda Abubakar, 54 Years, Oral Interview, University of Jos, Jos North LGA, Plateau State, Nigeria. 06/07/2023.

- ii. Provided that a person shall not become a citizen of Nigeria by virtue of this section if neither of his parents nor any of his grandparents was born in Nigeria.
- iii. Every person born in Nigeria after the date of independence, either of whose parent or any of whose grandparents is a citizen of Nigeria, and
- iv. Every person born outside Nigeria, either of whose parents is a citizen of Nigeria.<sup>9</sup>

However, according to Section 147(3), an indigene is a native of a community or Aborigine of that community, and Section 318 also mentions it. What this meant was that to be qualified for indigeneship of a community, the person must have been born in that community or be a 'son of the soil.' Lastly, indigeneship, migration, or any other extraneous factor determined, denied, or limited what a citizen enjoyed or the level he/she aspired to depending on the environment and the factors/laws specified for its workability. For example, Chapters 11 and 111 of the 1999 Constitution guaranteed freedom from discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, religion, place of origin, sex, and political opinion.

The notion of indigeneship of a particular society implied that there were certain rights the indigenes enjoyed, which non-indigenes did not enjoy simply because they were settlers or migrants. Such rights included unhindered access to scholarship, bursary, and employment; access to communal land; and the right to choose the chief or head of the community. This notion perhaps informed the indigenous people's disposition to the Hausa/Fulani in Jos and other parts of Plateau North. To the indigenous people, the Hausa/Fulani were citizens of Nigeria, recognized by law, and allowed to stay and do business anywhere in the state as permitted by law. But since they already had a root where they migrated from, they could only participate in political activities if popular enough to represent their wards. But for privileges reserved for the indigenes of the state, they were not allowed to share because they had other places to go to, but the indigenous groups did not. The Hausa/Fulani had a vast population in Plateau North, especially Jos, where they migrated for labor in the tin mines before and during colonialism.<sup>10</sup>

### **Indigenous Certificate in Plateau North**

The vagueness of the Nigerian Constitution led to the introduction of the indigene certificate, issued by local government areas in the country. The flip side of this was that it allowed the local government areas discretion in deciding the qualifications for the

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<sup>9</sup> 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. p. 31

<sup>10</sup> Henry Gyang Mang and David Ehrhardt. "The Politics of Paper: Negotiating Over and Around Indigeneship Certification in Plateau State, Nigeria", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 7th February, 2019). pp. 1-17; Oladiran Afolabi "Migration and Citizenship Question in Nigeria: A Study of the Berom and Hausa/Fulani Conflict in Jos", *Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, (February, 2016), Vol. 10 (2) pp.8-15.

indigenous certificate in their areas. Consequently, most local government areas collaborated with the traditional authorities in their domain to identify who qualified for this certificate. In the Jos North Local Government Area and other parts of Plateau North, the Hausa/Fulani complained that without the indigene certificate, their children were helpless and were losing the opportunity to access the important document to help them obtain political and economic opportunities. They complained that at the creation of Jos North Local Government Area in 1991, the indigene certificates were shared equally among the indigenes and the settlers, and it was signed by the district heads. However, the indigenous groups complained that allowing the Hausa/Fulani to continue to access the indigene certificates deprived them of job opportunities, scholarships, and appointments that were meant for them.<sup>11</sup>

### **Indigene/Settler Dichotomy**

The indigene/settler dichotomy was the contention over the ownership of Jos and was one of the formidable factors for mobilizing sentiments and the sensibilities of the people. Before the return to civilian rule in 1999, civil disturbances, contestations, and attendant violence became widespread in parts of Jos North and South Local Government Areas, respectively. Between 2001 and 2010, there were violent conflicts in Jos and clashes between indigenous farmers and Fulani cattle herders in which thousands of lives were lost. There were also inter-communal conflicts between indigenous Christian and Muslim settlers in Yelwa/Shendam between 2002 and 2004, which resulted in the death of about 3000 people.<sup>12</sup>

### **Ethnicity and Religion**

The heterogeneous nature of Jos and its environs was identified as a key factor in the incessant conflicts in Plateau North. Also, ethnic identity frequently coincided with religious affiliations during clashes. While the indigenes were mostly Christians, the Hausa/Fulani were predominantly Muslims. That was why the clashes in the state between the two groups were often perceived as ethno-religious. The Hausa and the Fulani are two different ethnic groups with different languages, but what bound them together was religion. They came together and formed the JASAWA groups to pursue their cause in Plateau North. The majority of the episodic spectacles of violent clashes in Jos and its environs were along religious and ethnic lines.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> D. C. Bach. "Managing Plural Society: The Boomerang Effects of Nigerian Federalism" *Journal of Commonwealth and Comprehensive Politics*, (1989), Vol. 27, (2). pp. 218-296.

<sup>12</sup> Human Rights Watch. "Revenge in the Name of Religion: The Cycle of Violence in Plateau and Kano State", Vol.17 (8), (May, 2005). pp. 5-6

<sup>13</sup> Ogoh. S. Alubo and Musa Ilu. "Ethnicity, Religion and Citizenship Crisis in Plateau State, Nigeria", *Council for the Development of Social Science Research in African*, African Development, (2011) Vol. 36 (1); Jana Krause A. "Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State Nigeria", *Working Paper*, (Geneva, 2011). Available at [www.files.ethz.ch/isn](http://www.files.ethz.ch/isn). Accessed 10/06/2021.

### **Theoretical Framework**

To analyse the implication of perspectives in the indigenous/settler conflicts in Plateau North, the paper adopts the ethnic competition theory. The theory explains that the indigene/settler feuds arose from group struggles over scarce resources. When social dichotomies are built, they shape identities that in turn mobilize intergroup competition for resources, which leads to conflict. The theory also explains the role of religious identities rooted in historical, social, and psychological foundations, noting that many ethnic perspectives' ties stemmed from subjective forces that influenced both individual and collective needs of the people.<sup>14</sup>

Within this framework, the recurrent crises in Plateau North were understood as products of ethnic constructions designed to access means of livelihoods, resources, and political dominance. When this strategy favoured one over another, conflict definitely came up, and where compromise failed, violent conflict was the end result. Over the years, Plateau North witnessed numerous clashes linked to frictions in the indigenous/settler relationship, particularly regarding land ownership, political representation, and claims to indigeneity. In Jos Plateau, for instance, political contests between the indigenous Christian and the migrant Hausa/Fulani communities frequently escalated into violence, resulting in killings, maiming, destruction of properties, and mass displacement.

### **The Plateau North Conflicts**

The beliefs about opportunities of success, costs of loss such as relatives, population size, control of state, belief of existential threat, and beliefs about others such as self-rightness and wrongness or inhumanity to others were the sources of conflicts. The above-listed points made conflict analysis challenging through the perceptions by the parties in the conflict in Jos and other parts of Plateau North. This in turn provided a psychological worldview and the foundation for other levels of conflict by the parties. Perception was a product of competition and may not necessarily be right, but it contributed to presenting how the main parties in a conflict, and sometimes how the secondary parties, viewed conflicts.<sup>15</sup>

### **The Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere Perspectives of the Conflict in Jos**

Although all the indigenous ethnic groups unanimously agreed that the Hausa/Fulani were immigrants and settlers in Plateau North, they themselves had different views on who were the original owners of Jos Plateau.

The Berom perception was that prior to the coming of the colonialists, they, along with the Anaguta, were in control of the autonomous administration in Jos. They opined that the colonialist, after making Jos an administrative center, brought the Hausa to Jos to

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<sup>14</sup> Susan Olzak. *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1992).

<sup>15</sup> Shedrack G. Best. *Conflict and Peace Building in Plateau State*, Nigeria, (Ibadan, Spectrum Books, 2007), p.19-23

assist with labor in the tin mines. The Berom argued that before the coming of the white people, what was called Jos was named *Jot*, but the Europeans and the Hausa/Fulani changed the name to Jos. The Hausa later renamed some streets in Jos with Hausa names, which they now use as reasons for having founded Jos and therefore claim indigeneshhip. Among the places in Jos that were renamed by the Hausa were Kabong, changed to Gada Biyu; Laranto, to Katako; Gwong, to Nasarawa; Berukuru, to Bukuru; Rot Noro, to Ali Kazaure; Gura Lohmetjei, to Angwan Rogo; etc.<sup>16</sup>

The Berom further argued that they were reluctant to cooperate with the earliest European miners, the Hausa immigrants, and Fulani pastoralists in the early years of their arrival because they did not trust them. They preferred their farming businesses rather than work in the mines. They rejected the coming of the Hausa immigrants into their land at the early stage until the colonialists prevailed on them to stop. They saw the Hausa as people who spread sicknesses and diseases anywhere they went.<sup>17</sup>

The Anaguta shared the same perspectives with the Berom and the Afizere to some extent concerning the ownership of Jos. The Anaguta condemned the continuous claim by the Hausa/Fulani that Jos belonged to them, stressing that even though they were instrumental to the growth of Jos during its evolution, that did not grant them the indigene rights of Jos. The Anaguta argued that the Hausa/Fulani had nothing to do with the traditional rulership of Jos; their claims that they ruled Jos were baseless since they did not conquer Plateau during the Jihad. The Anaguta dismissed the idea of the Hausa chiefs as rulers of Jos, since they were not given any staff of office and they represented only the Hausa/Fulani in the tin mining settlement in their area. They advised the Hausa/Fulani to be content with being citizens and settlers and forget about the indigeneshhip of Jos.

Meanwhile, the Anaguta saw themselves as the pioneer indigenous group in Jos since they were the first indigenous people the Europeans met when they first landed in Jos during the pre-colonial era. The Anaguta buttress the fact that all the wards and districts in Jos were in Anaguta land, as they gave their original name for Jos as "*Uzheashi*," meaning a place where people gather. They repelled the jihadists during the time of Uthman Dan Fodio.<sup>18</sup>

The Afizere agreed with the submission of the Berom and the Anaguta that the Hausa/Fulani were indeed settlers/non-indigenes in Jos and therefore had no right to the indigeneship of Jos. However, Afizere disagreed with the Berom and Anaguta on who truly owned Jos, as Jos belonged to Afizere with evidence to show for it. According to them, the name Jos came from the corruption of *Gwash* in Afizere language which the colonialist miss-pronounced as Jos. The area was located around the present Jos Museum and that the traditional boundary between the Berom and the Afizere was at the Bukuru low-cost bridge.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> *ibid*, pp.28-29

<sup>17</sup> *ibid*, pp. 30-31

<sup>18</sup> *ibid*, pp. 32-33

<sup>19</sup> *ibid*, pp 34-35

### The Hausa and Fulani Perspectives

The Hausa argument was that they founded the Jos Plateau and nurtured it to its modern city status without any contribution from the indigenous ethnic groups in the area. Their argument was that they founded Jos in about 1902 as virgin land and that during that period, the indigenes were living across the hills in the city. They dismissed the claims by the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere that they were the owners of Jos and concluded that Jos belonged to the Hausa as the indigenes of Jos. They asserted that as the first settlers in Naraguta, they were relocated by the Europeans to where there was more land and space. The early settlers (non-indigenes) in Jos were those who refused to go back to the far north after their transit businesses. The mining population increased as traders, butchers, carpenters, Koranic teachers, and other artisans also migrated to Jos because of the booming tin mining businesses.<sup>20</sup>

Traditionally, the Hausa claimed to have produced the *Sarkin* (chief) Jos from 1902 to 1948. When the last *Sarkin* Jos, Isiaku Gwamna, died, a claim the indigenous groups refuted, insisting that those Hausa chiefs only controlled the mining camps and markets around the mining communities. They were appointed to administer their kinfolk, the Hausa laborers in the tin mines, and not the natives, thus the title of *Sarkin Hausawa* (Chief of Hausa).<sup>21</sup> Commenting on this, McCain asserted:

I understand the Hausas have lived in Jos for many generations and yet are not considered citizens of the state. The Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta regard them as settlers. In the United States, where I come from, there are citizen rights, and it's very easy to move from one state to another and become a citizen of that state. We don't have the concept of indigenization like in Nigeria. The American model is different from that of Nigeria. My take is that when it comes to political, economic, and social rights, everybody should be allowed to participate if they have a support base, but when it comes to certain traditional issues such as chieftaincy, it should be reversed for the indigenes.<sup>22</sup>

The Hausa also pointed to their political contribution to Jos, having been elected/appointed to represent the area at different positions of responsibility dating back to the colonial period. Some of those who represented the area politically were Isa Haruna at the pre-independence conference and Audu Danladi at the Constituent Assembly in 1978, among others.

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<sup>20</sup> *ibid* 24-25

<sup>21</sup> *ibid*

<sup>22</sup> Kenny McCain, 72 Years, Oral Interview, Director, Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies, University of Jos, Jos, Jos North LGA, Plateau State, Nigeria. 22/06/2023.

The Fulani stated that they had nothing to do with the conflict in Jos since they were not interested in the political and social participation there. Their problem was the conflict between the indigenous farmers and the pastoralists, and they prayed for an amicable settlement. They complained of attacks on them and rustling of their cattle by the indigenes because they were Muslims. They blamed this development on the insensitivity of the indigenes, who thought that the destruction of their farms was deliberate. When that happened, they usually settled the matter out of court and paid compensation to the farm owners, and the reprisal attack from the Fulani herders was when their cows were stolen by the indigenes. They accused the indigenes of jealousy because of their wealth and their striving pastoral businesses. They concluded that they were satisfied with their nomads' status, as long as they were allowed to move about with their cattle and graze around any environment they found themselves in.<sup>23</sup>

### **The Implication of the Conflicts in Plateau North**

The effects of conflict on the socio-political and economic development and activities of Plateau North cannot be overemphasized, as it touched on every aspect of the area. Apart from the political sector, which suffered greatly due to constant clashes between the indigenous people and the Hausas during elections, the economic and social sectors were badly affected. This led to segregation in educational, residential, economic, and social arrangements.

Politics was a source of conflict in Plateau North, especially in Jos where all the violent conflicts stemmed from bitter political campaigns, ward congresses, local government elections among others. All the violent clashes in Jos during elections were fueled by perceptions by the contending parties- the indigenous people and the Hausa/Fulani settlers. Beginning with the first major conflict in 1994 to the 2001 ethno-religious conflict, the Eto Baba PDP Ward Congress in 2002 and 2008 local government election were all product of conflicts. Other parts of Plateau State where politics was a major driver of conflict were- Yelwah Shendam, Wase, Quan-Pan and Kanam. In these Local Government Areas, access to political office through party ward congresses and local government elections resulted in violent clashes.<sup>24</sup>

Another implication was the social segregation in Jos metropolis and in towns such as Gashish and Miango in Barkin Ladi and Bassa Local Government Areas, respectively. In Jos, people did not take accommodation in any part of the town they fancied, as they had to do extensive study to find out if the area was safe. Residential houses in the predominantly Christian area in Jos South were considered as having no value to the Muslims, no matter how magnificent and splendid the accommodations were. The same thing was applicable to the area that was occupied by the Muslims.

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid* pp. 35-36

<sup>24</sup> Shedrack Gaya Best, Christian Willie and Abu Sabastine Saidu, *Pen and Peace: The Plateau State Experience*, Jos, International Centre for Reconciliation and Centre for Conflicts Management and Peace Studies, (University of Jos, (2007).

In Jos, there were areas occupied by Christians, and there were also areas occupied by Muslims. Also, people were very careful about places they visited. It was not safe for a Christian to visit a predominantly Muslim neighborhood alone or late at night. Even boarding a taxi and a tricycle, people were very careful due to security concerns. Thus, places in Jos such as Rikkos, Ungwar Rogo, Ungwar Shanu, Bauchi Road, etc. were dominated by Muslims. Similarly, Tudun Wada, Ungwar Rukuba, Tina Junction, etc. were inhabited by Christian faithful.<sup>25</sup>

Following the segregated residential relocation were the educational and health sectors, as thousands of qualified professionals in these fields fled the areas, fearing lack of safety. Students and pupils who at the early stages of their education attended schools in their neighborhood and mixed up without minding ethnic and religious inclinations became segregated into Christian and Muslim schools and some exclusively. An analysis of the pattern of student enrollment and staff distributions in some government schools (primary and secondary) in the Jos North Local Government Area showed progressive evolution of schools from a mixture of Christians and Muslims to those of exclusive Christians or Muslims-dominated schools, which depicted religious and ethnic cleavages, the Muslims being mainly Hausa/Fulani from the far north and Christians being the indigenous people from the state and those from the southern part of the country.

In table 1 below, Gangare is a predominantly Muslim settlement in the city of Jos. Before the 2001 crisis, 53 of the 561 students in Government Secondary School, Gangare, which represented 10.27 percent, were Christians. In the 2001/2002 academic session, following the outbreak of violence, the percentage of enrollment by Christians dropped by 2%, and this continued till 2006/2007. However, following the 2008 violent conflict, enrollment plummeted to below 26 from 43 in the previous session. The trend continued in the 2009/2010 session, in which there were only 6 enrolments of Christian students in the school. The 2010 violence brought the Christian students' enrollment in the school to 0% in the 2010/2011 session. The staff distributions also experienced a sharp drop from the Christian perspectives as they dropped from 18 Christian teachers in the 2000/2001 session to 11 in the 2009/2010 session, and by 2011, all the Christian teachers, including the principal of the school, abandoned their duty for fear of their safety.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Obadiah Samuel, Chris Kwaja and Angela Olofu-Adeoye. "The Challenges of Post-Conflict Partitioning of Contested Cities in Northern Nigeria", in Shedrack Best, ed, *Religion and Post Conflict Peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria*, (Ibadan, John Archers Books, 2011) pp 48-49.

<sup>26</sup> Dinshiak Luka Dajahar, "Social Segregation and the Emergence of Exclusive Educational Institution in Jos: Implication for Peace", In Audu Nanven Gambo, eds, *Architecture of Peace in Jos City, Nigeria*, (University of Jos Press, 2013). pp. 50-52.

**Table 1: Pattern of Students Enrolment and Staff Distribution for Government Secondary School, Gangare.**

| Session   | Muslim Students | Christian Students | Total Students | Muslim Staff | Christian Staff | Total Staff |
|-----------|-----------------|--------------------|----------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------|
| 2000/2001 | 50              | 53                 | 561            | 4            | 18              | 22          |
| 2002/2003 | 580             | 51                 | 631            | 3            | 18              | 21          |
| 2004/2005 | 400             | 37                 | 437            | 4            | 17              | 21          |
| 2008/2009 | 173             | 26                 | 188            | 8            | 13              | 21          |
| 2009/2010 | 125             | 6                  | 131            | 9            | 11              | 20          |
| 2010/2011 | 78              | 0                  | 78             | 9            | 11              | 20          |

**Source:** Government Secondary School, Gangare

In Government Secondary School, Tudun Wada, located in a Christian-dominated area, the movement of Muslims from the settlement was also reflected in students' enrollment and the numbers of staff. In tables 2 and 3 below, while 188 of the 1028 students in the 2000/2001 session were Muslims, with the staff distributions of 2 Muslims and 38 Christians, by 2007, it dropped by about 50%. By the 2010/2011 session, there were neither Muslim students nor staff in the school.

**Table 2: Pattern of Students Enrolment and Staff Distribution for Government Junior Secondary School, Tudun Wada.**

| Session   | Muslim Students | Christian Students | Total Students | Muslim Staff | Christian Staff | Total Staff |
|-----------|-----------------|--------------------|----------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------|
| 2000/2001 | 188             | 840                | 1028           | 2            | 38              | 40          |
| 2002/2003 | 177             | 1107               | 1284           | 1            | 34              | 35          |
| 2004/2005 | 87              | 1183               | 1200           | 1            | 30              | 31          |
| 2008/2009 | 29              | 551                | 580            | -            | 21              | 21          |
| 2009/2010 | 8               | 469                | 477            | -            | 21              | 21          |
| 2010/2011 | -               | 294                | 294            | -            | 21              | 21          |

**Source:** Government Secondary School, Tudun Wada

**Table 3: Pattern of Student's Enrolment and Staff Distribution for Government Senior Secondary School, Tudun Wada.**

| Session   | Muslim Students | Christian Students | Total Students | Muslim Staff | Christian Staff | Total Staff |
|-----------|-----------------|--------------------|----------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------|
| 2000/2001 | 175             | 545                | 720            | 3            | 29              | 32          |
| 2002/2003 | 41              | 612                | 622            | 2            | 27              | 29          |
| 2004/2005 | 48              | 600                | 648            | 2            | 30              | 32          |
| 2008/2009 | 11              | 354                | 365            | 2            | 28              | 29          |
| 2009/2010 | 5               | 258                | 353            | -            | 27              | 27          |

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|           |   |     |     |   |    |    |
|-----------|---|-----|-----|---|----|----|
| 2010/2011 | 1 | 263 | 264 | - | 23 | 23 |
|-----------|---|-----|-----|---|----|----|

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**Source:** Government Secondary School, Tudun Wada

The same observation was seen at Government Secondary School, Ungwar Rogo, and Plateau Commercial Technical Institute, Bauchi Road, all in a Muslim-segregated area. In these schools, students' enrolments and staff strength continued to drop during the period of the conflict till the present. Also, in the Government Junior Secondary School, Naraguta; Government Science Secondary School; Anglo, Jos; Maygo High School; Rock Heaven; and Zaria Road, which were in Christian-dominated areas, the Muslim students' enrolment dropped considerably, as did staff in some schools. Meanwhile, it was found that segregation that led to exclusive education and residence caused mistrust among children till adulthood. They lived segregated lives as adults, and it made integration difficult because of stereotypes. It was discovered that when people of different cultures stay apart from each other, prejudice and negative stereotypes are established because of the tendency for them to confirm or reject themselves.<sup>27</sup>

Another implication was the segregated religious settlement in the city of Jos. The 2001, 2004, 2008, and 2010 crises in the Jos metropolis led to the dislocation of many inhabitants of the city. Religious gathering for worship in the city took a new format. This was as a result of fear and mistrust even in segregated neighborhoods. As an ethnic marker, religion was an emblem in decision-making not only in Plateau North but also in Plateau State and was a determining factor in the perpetuation of segregation.<sup>28</sup>

Meanwhile, the ethno-religious conflicts in Plateau North led to the challenges in the partitioning of the post-conflict contested city, especially the Jos metropolis. It was very common during violent clashes for rival groups to attempt to eliminate or outdo each other. These groups were either ethnic or religious in order to gain superiority in numerical strength to establish exclusive settlements, as earlier mentioned. It was the fear of repeated attacks, as groups felt that the only way/option was for them to come together for quicker and more decisive responses in case of further attack by rival groups. This arrangement led to a homogenous settlement, which was defined as "a settlement that had the capacity to draw strength and support from within the community by virtue of their group identity that they collectively shared as a basis for solidarity and security."<sup>29</sup>

The return to democratic rule in 1999 witnessed increased religious intolerance and fundamentalism not only in Plateau North but in the whole of Plateau State. Although it was improbable to attribute the cause(s) of religious fundamentalism to a single factor, the roles of religious agencies, security personnel, targeted individuals, non-state actors, and conflict entrepreneurs were linked to factors such as the failure of governance,

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>28</sup> Anthony I. Umoh "Implication of Indigene/Settler Conflicts on the socio-Economic Activities of Plateau State, Nigeria, 2000-2010", *Global Journal of Modern Research and Emerging Trends (GJMRET)*, (September, 2025), Vol. 1 (5). pp. 45-66.

<sup>29</sup> Bagudu. *Recrudescence Civil Disturbances and Human Rights: The Jos and State-Wide Crisis*, (Jos, League of Human Rights, 2004). pp. 82-90.

compounded by intense economic and political corruption. The surge in religious fundamentalism in the Plateau North was attributed to weak security architecture in Northern Nigeria, where fault-line wars were on the increase. The failure of government to provide security to the residents enabled the spread of groups such as Boko Haram, bandits, etc., who carried out violent attacks on residents. The influx of these religious fundamentalists and mercenaries into Plateau North heightened criminality in the zone. They were used as a key source of identity among the Islamic community in Plateau North, and it strengthened their social cohesion against Christians.<sup>30</sup>

### Conclusion

Conflicts in Plateau North were fueled by frustration and relative deprivation in accessing inalienable rights within the environment. The incompatibility of the indigenous people and the Hausa/Fulani settlers in politics, resource allocation, and social engagements were constant triggers of violent conflicts in the area. The claims and counterclaims by the conflict parties to the indigeneship of Jos and access to lands and water in the communities of Plateau North for farming and grazing were a constant threat to the peaceful coexistence. The Hausa/Fulani hinged their indigeneship claims on the pre-colonial and colonial arrangement, where the Plateau area was part of the Bauchi Emirate; their influence in tin ore mining camps in and around Jos, where they constituted the largest labor force; and the citizenship rights as enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution. Arms proliferation prolonged the conflicts and was linked to most of the crises and killings in the area and state. The gradual influx of these arms increased the rate, tempo, and incidences of conflicts not only in Plateau North but also in the state. Therefore, security agencies and personnel have a duty to come up with security strategies that can contain this surge and bring relative peace to Plateau North and state.

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<sup>30</sup> Gideon Pwakim. *The Persistence of Religious Violence in the Northern Nigeria and the Search for Peaceful Co-existence: A Theoretical Perspective*, (Black Tower Publisher, 2020) pp. 54-55; Samuel Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (London, Simon and Schuster Books, 1996). pp. 208-211

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