Realism and International Security: A Study of the Logic of Competition and Cooperation in Inter-State Relations
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.67487/ijprss.v2i2.290Keywords:
Realist Theory, International Security, Structural Realism, State SurvivalAbstract
This paper is a discourse on key features of the realist theory as one of the approaches to the study of international security. Realism places much emphasis on the currency of power, taking into due cognisance the nature and structure of the international system. This paper explores the major variants within the world of realism and their relevance to state security policies. Such a variant includes structural realism, which addresses the impact of the international system in the perspective of the behavioral pattern of states, and motivational realism, which stresses the impact of variation on the motives of states. Furthermore, the paper interrogates the arguments between the structural, offensive, and defensive realists concerning the nature of the international system in generating or adopting competitive and cooperative policies. The paper, using the analytical method of historical writing and relying mainly on secondary sources, argues that realism is a widely accepted and dominant theory of international politics. That it is largely on the basis of how realists depict the international environment that they assert the view that states are the major actors in the international system. That the first priority for states is to ensure their survival and the most important and indispensable means of survival is self-help. In this light, the paper concludes that realism subscribes to the three Ss: statism, survival, and self-help. Statism, being the centerpiece of realism; survival, the primary objective of the state; and self-help, the most important means of survival.
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